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Some contributions 
of philosophy to education1
¿Para qué sirve la filosofía de la educación? ¿Cuál es la
contribución de las finalidades, habilidades y actitudes fi-
losóficas a la práctica educativa? ¿Qué se puede lograr? En
este artículo, no se pretende considerar ninguna doctrina
filosófica en particular. Tampoco se trata de examinar las
implicaciones educativas de uno u otro punto de vista filo-
sófico. En vez de eso, la reflexión está dirigida a la activi-
dad filosófica en sí misma. Por tanto, las preguntas son más
bien generales y ciertamente no son nuevas. Sin embargo, es-
tas preguntas adquieren un especial relieve desde la pers-
pectiva de las tendencias actuales, que probablemente ten-
drán una creciente influencia en las futuras circunstan-
cias de nuestra vida y en nuestras concepciones operativas
de la educación.
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Of what use is philosophy to education? What do philosop-
hical purposes, skills and attitudes bring to educational
practice? What might they accomplish? My concern in what
follows is not with any particular set of philosophical doc-
trines, nor am I inquiring after the educational implica-
tions of this or that philosophical viewpoint. Rather, my
questions pertain to philosophical activity itself. The ques-
tions are thus quite general and they are certainly not
new. But they take on special urgency when viewed in the
perspective of current trends that are likely increasingly
to affect our future circumstances of life and our operati-
ve conceptions of education.
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1. Current trends
What are these trends? We have been living through a period that has
seen a remarkable burst of technological energy which has already
transformed, and, will continue to transform a wide variety of human
activities, including education, in ways that can hardly be foreseen.
Advances in the underlying special sciences have, concomitantly,
proceeded apace, spawning a welter of new technical conceptualizations in
the physical, biological, social, and professional fields, and challenging our
prior assumptions concerning life and death, morality and society.
Modes of transportation, communication, and interaction in every
sphere have been radically accelerated, with the result that our globe has
shrunk in physical size while cultural distances have, ironically, often
widened and become more opaque to mutual understanding. And while the sciences and the global
technical culture they have made possible base themselves on appeal to stringent empirical tests, open
theoretical debate, and objective criteria of evidence, large segments of our public have increasingly
rejected the very notions of objective inquiry and the pursuit of truth, replacing them with the idea
that subjectivism rules and (almost) anything goes. Clearly, there is work for philosophy to do in
responding to our new intellectual and cultural situation. I shall here outline some types of
philosophical work that seem to me pressing under present circumstances and of particular
importance in and for education.
2. The rationale of scientific inquiry 
First, I consider the task of developing a broad intellectual approach to the advancing scientific
specializations that surround us on all sides. These specializations pose difficult challenges to the
understanding when they are seen either as self-enclosed authorities embodying indubitable truths or
else as arbitrary forms of social self-expression. What is urgently needed, by students and public alike,
is an insight into the rationale of scientific inquiry-a grasp of the basic logic animating the provisional
conclusions of the special sciences. These conclusions need to be understood, explicated, and related
to the methods of inquiry by which they are developed and evaluated. The more such specializations
impinge on public policy, the more urgent it is to make the rationale of their deliverances as well as
their limitations understandable to a broad public, beginning, first of all, with the students in our
schools. The desired aim in this context is to present science not as primarily an engine of technology,
but rather, and above all, as a dynamic form of self-critical thought powered by the imagination yet
answerable to the demands of logic and credible evidence.
This requires not only that the special idioms of scientific specialties be interpreted in terms
accessible to the layman, to whatever extent this is possible, but also that the structures of their
reasoning be grasped-that their assertions be viewed not as isolated and inert facts but as provisional
judgments arising out of a creative search for explanatory theories, tempered by an empirical
assessment of their adequacy. In turn, this requires that basic curricula in the schools be designed
accordingly, so as to interpret their specialized materials to the novice rather than presenting them as
fixed and final. Understood in the context of scientific reasoning, such materials are to be seen as
bounded by the methodology supplying whatever authority they can claim.
In this curricular task, thinkers concerned with the history and philosophy of science have the
capability to contribute significantly, both in explicating technical concepts and in setting forth the
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inferential patterns motivating the data of specialized investigations. Such
thinkers may thus assist in overcoming the narrow treatment of subject
matter, and help in exhibiting such matter as neither dogmatic nor arbitrary
but rather as exemplifying principles of critical thought.
3. Practice and disciplinary variety
When we turn from understanding the data of particular specializations
to the question of understanding their applications to practice or policy, we
confront additional problems2. For such applications do not flow directly
from given scientific disciplines taken one at a time. When the findings of
a special discipline are to be brought to bear on practice, they need to be
conjoined with other special findings, since practical problems are never exhaustively solvable by the
single discipline. Thus, it is not only the internal rationale of any given scientific specialization that
needs to be grasped but also its conjoint bearing, along with other relevant specializations, on
practical problems of interest. Each specialization to be acquired by our students is to be presented
not only in terms of its internal disciplinary context, but also with reference to its foreign relations,
that is, the points of potential contact between it and other special studies.
The disciplines are, in effect, to be taught to our students not only linearly but also as ranged
around the common practical problems to which they may be applied as relevant groups. Since the
members of these groups are typically organized by different concepts and interests, the learner must,
if he is to apply his learning to practice, acquire the ability to step outside the bounds of the discipline
which may be most familiar to him. He cannot retire into the core of this discipline and stay there;
he needs to hear the voices of those without who speak in foreign tongues, and needs also to make
him self understood to those who dwell beyond. A sensitivity to the languages and procedures of
diverse inquiries is required, along with the willingness to hear others who have been differently
trained. Further, the learner needs an ability to use disparate disciplines jointly in attacking practical
problems, linking them, where possible, through translation or partial translation and — beyond the
reach of translation altogether-an ability to assign the items of varying specializations to different
segments of the practical problems in question3.
In fostering the requisite sensitivity to linguistic and procedural variation, philosophy has another
important contribution to make. For philosophers are professionally disposed to deal with a plurality
of subject matters and a variety of languages, seeing the commonalties as well as the, differences
between them, translating back and forth where possible and putting relevant varieties together in
application to problems. Trained in the history of thought, philosophers are committed to making
sense of diverse abstruse systems, and committed also to seeing how such systems relate to one
another, how they may be intertranslatable and how they may, on the contrary, repel one another in
content, style, or procedure. Such predispositions are of inestimable value in curricular formation and
in teaching not just for disciplinary understanding but also for disciplinary application to practice and
policy.
 ESE Nº3 2002

  
   

2 For my defence of the ideal of objectivity in science, see Scheffler, 1982.
3 For the application of scientific disciplines to practice, see chapter IV “The Education of Policy Makers” of Scheffler, 1985.
4. Appreciation and human understanding
We have so far spoken of enhancing the understanding of specialized
data by placing them within a context of logical structure and relevant
methodological constraint. In dealing with applications to practice and
policy, we have, further, emphasized the need for avoiding tunnel vision in
order to profit from the various specializations bearing on practical
solutions.
In both of these respects, philosophy has much to offer. But this is not
all.
The application of special scientific studies to practical problems goes
beyond disciplinary specializations altogether. For “the awareness of such
problems is not the monopoly of any special discipline nor is it the
exclusive province of any set of disciplines. Pooling the specialized perspectives of the several forms
of inquiry does not yet guarantee human understanding” (Scheffler, 1985) that is, comprehension of
the human problems on which such perspectives are brought to bear.
Applications affect the activities, values, thoughts and feelings of various people and these require
to be taken into account in evaluating the applications in question. Taking them into account means
that we understand what people say when they describe their circumstances and express their
opinions, their fears and their hopes. It means that we have access to the way affected persons
understand themselves and define their situations, that “we hear what they say when they speak in
their own voice” (Scheffler, 1985). Here what is required is not just the sensitivity to language that we
have described as a philosophical virtue, but also the willingness to listen genuinely, to enter
sympathetically into the thought worlds of others, as expressed not in the locutions of any specialized
inquiry, but the informal, and often idiosyncratic expressions of everyday life, colored by personal
habit and predilection. The philosopher, trained to enter into the systematic worlds of radically
diverse thinkers, to attempt to gauge their circumstances, motivations and expressions-in short, to
reconstruct their thought sympathetically, has a vital contribution to make to the formation of pupils,
who will be applying, as well as absorbing, the data of specialized studies in the whole of their future
lives.
5. Application and value
Application to practice involves choice. It is not enough to have the requisite knowledge to realize
a variety of alternatives for dealing with a practical problem. Nor is it enough to know how each
alternative will impinge on the lives of those it affects. To choose an alternative for realization is an
expression of: preference, a conferring of value upon such alternative, which creates a precedent, thus,
in effect, creating a presumptive principle of action. R. M. Hare has emphasized the fact that decisions
are the germs of principles which reverberate into other cases without limit (Hare, 1952, pp. 56-78).
Awareness of the incipient principles one is thus expressing in application is awareness of one’s actual
values, and facilitates their critical review.
A critical self-consciousness respecting one’s values is a primary aim of education. It is one that is
particularly urgent in a time of rapid technological change, when its momentum threatens to sweep
all before it, overwhelming both moral scruple and human feeling. To attain this educational aim it
is essential to, be able to discourse about values, to navigate fearlessly in the conceptual areas where
factual and value considerations intermingle. To avoid blindness in action, it is essential to grapple
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with the task of formulating a code of moral principle by which one may act
reflectively. Here, philosophy is of inestimable assistance, for unlike modern
dispositions to avoid value discussions altogether or to consider values
beyond rational treatment, philosophy embodies a tradition of over two
millennia in which value considerations are treated seriously, subtly and
comprehensively. To build elements of this tradition into educational
curricula is an important contribution of philosophy to, an educational
future of ethical substance.
6. The past and the present
The mention of the long tradition of philosophical discussion raises for
consideration another important benefit that philosophy renders to education. This benefit lies in the
very fact that philosophical discussion inevitably recalls its past. Unlike scientific and mathematical
training, which move ever onward, leaving past developments behind, philosophical study never
outgrows its past, recalling earlier thinkers and arguments even as it forges ahead. Placing the
intellectual, literary, and moral contents of school curricula in the context of a long history of relevant
treatments, philosophy thus breaks the tenacious hold of the present upon the consciousness of
modern youth.
The present is of course the scene of all activity to be undertaken by our pupils and must therefore
retain its centrality for their deliberations. Yet, untempered by memory, a focus on the present is a
source of blindness, eliminating the funded experience of our predecessors from consideration as a
resource for current understanding and perception. Strengthened by the momentum of technological
advance which looks ever toward the potential transformation of prevailing arrangements by new
devices and never looks back, the present-centeredness of much contemporary schooling runs the risk
of distorting educational values by its cultural amnesia.
A current example is the impact of the computer on educational thinking. The computer is, of
course, the agent of vast changes in social arrangements in recent years, and technical concepts of
information and algorithm are its intellectual underpinnings. Opportunities for increased efficiency
in teaching and enhanced individualization of learning are but two promises of computer applications
that prudent educators need to explore. But the basic hazard educators need to confront is a
narrowing of their educational vision-a reduction of their fundamental concepts to presumed
technological correlates. It is in helping to overcome this hazard that philosophy may now serve
education as an important resource4.
Traditional epistemology, to take one central instance, views knowledge -even in its purely
propositional form, as distinct from know-how or skill- in the broad contexts of truth, evidence, and
belief. Knowledge, it insists, cannot be reduced to information alone, in the technical sense, i.e. to
bits of bare propositional content. An item of knowledge, to qualify as such, must also be true.
Education, insofar as it concerns knowledge, must therefore rest on an appeal to truth, assessing the
truth-value of available content, and referring implicitly to operative standards of truth.
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Nor, as epistemology shows, can knowledge be presumed to depend
solely on algorithm. A claim to knowledge bears reference to evidence but
such evidence in general comprises good reasons in support of a conclusion
rather than only algorithms or decision procedures, or even proofs. Even
where proof is indeed available, it is important to note that, whereas it is
subject to check by routine process, it cannot be discovered by routine
process. The generation of proofs is a creative rather than an algorithmic
outcome of inquiry, a matter of heuristics, ingenuity and luck rather than
mechanical routine.
Finally, knowledge is, for epistemology, no merely impersonal unit of
propositional content, even if true and, moreover, grounded in adequate
evidence. For such content is always formulated in the concepts of a
historical language and it is embodied in belief, evidenced not only in assertions but also in actions
and purposes. To assess a claim to knowledge thus involves inquiry into concepts channeling relevant
beliefs as well as the purposes expressed in related conduct. To view knowledge not as an inert corpus
of informational items to be manipulated by algorithm, but rather as a domain of human belief
aspiring to truth, advancing through creative discovery and evidenced in statement, action and
purpose is thus the perspective that the heritage of philosophy lends to educational practice (Scheffler,
1965).
7. Information and educational aims
When we move beyond the educational aim of enhancing knowledge to consider educational aims
in general, we find the popular computer concept of information to be clearly inadequate.
“The everyday notion of information refers to material we can understand and interpret in
context. Grasping what it expresses, we can paraphrase it and evaluate its contextual relevance,
criticize and reject it or back it up appropriately, respond to it with feeling, sense its
metaphorical echoes, appraise its bearing on our purposes, and apply it in our activity. The
computer itself cannot be properly described as doing any of these things, in the everyday
senses of the terms involved. To characterize the electronic state of computer circuitry in terms
of information is to employ the word under a different interpretation. Further to construe the
mind in terms of “computer information” empties the human notion of virtually all its
content” (Scheffler, 1991, p. 91).
Even the full-blooded human sense of information is incapable of expressing all our educational
aims with respect to knowledge. As Ryle has put it, knowing a fact requires “having taken it in, i.e.,
being able and ready to operate with it, from it, around it and upon it. To possess a piece of
information is to be able to mobilize it apart from, its rote-neighbors and out of its rote-formulation
in unhackneyed and ad hoc tasks” (Ryle, 1967, p. 111). And learning, even in the context of problem-
solving, goes well beyond information, in any sense. For it does not simply acquire information but
“entertains suppositions, rejects the accepted, conceives the possible, elaborates the doubtful or false,
questions the familiar, guesses at the imaginable, improvises the unheard of. An intelligence capable
only of storing and applying bits of information would be profoundly incapacitated for the solving
of problems” (Scheffler, 1991, p. 93).
Beyond the language of information altogether are those traditional educational formulations that
speak of insight, skill, and norm. The first of these, i.e. insight, describes educational aims in terms of
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perception, vision and illumination, intuition of nuance and pattern,
imaginative grasp of overtone and undertone. The second, i.e. skill,
discusses aims in terms of the forming or strengthening of abilities, the
know-how commanded by a person rather than the know-that, the
capability to deal with the tasks and challenges in every domain of life. The
last of the three formulations focuses on norms rather than either
information or capacities, on the tendencies and dispositions of a person,
on what he does do rather than what he can do. Here again, we have left the
notion of information behind. For we are dealing here not with what people
believe nor with what they are equipped to do, but with their character, what
they can reliably be expected to do with their predictable patterns of
conduct, taste, and emotion.
These various realms of educational aims all need to be kept steadfastly in view as we make progress
on any educational front.
The whole array of ends embodied in the traditional locutions we have described must serve as the
context within which we gauge our educational situation. Rather than cutting this array down to the
size of our technology, we should strive to look beyond our technology, to determine the future
purposes and directions of our further efforts. And in this task, philosophy serves a vital function by
keeping the broadest conceptions of human learning in view as we move into a new and uncharted
technological future. 
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